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Abstract
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise
of natural selection. Favoring players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges faced by
cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory provides a competent theoretical framework
for addressing the subtleties of cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent advances
point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered
by cooperative behavior. Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been recognized as
potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend the potentials of such entities further, and even more
importantly, lead to the understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to evolutionary
games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as
well. Coevolutionary rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of players, their reputation,
mobility or age. Here we review recent works on evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as
give a didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with the subject. In addition, we briefly
outline directions for future research that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects of
coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely open to research and thus hold promise of
exciting new discoveries.
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1. Introduction
Cooperation and defection are the two strategies that
are usually at the heart of every social dilemma (Dawes,
1980). While cooperative individuals contribute to the
collective welfare at a personal cost, defectors choose
not to. Due to the resulting lower individual fitness
of cooperators the selection pressure acts in favor of
the defectors, thus designating the evolution of co-
operation as a dilemma standing on its own. Es-
tablished by Maynard Smith and Price (1973), evolu-
tionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982; Weibull,
1995; Gintis, 2000; Nowak, 2006a) provides a com-
petent theoretical framework to address the subtleties
of cooperation among selfish and unrelated individuals.
The prisoner’s dilemma game in particular, is consid-
ered a paradigm for tackling the problem of cooper-
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ation (Axelrod, 1984). The game promises a defect-
ing individual the highest fitness if facing a cooper-
ator. At the same time, the exploited cooperator is
worse off than a defector playing with another defec-
tor. According to the fundamental principles of Dar-
winian selection, cooperation extinction is therefore in-
evitable. This unadorned scenario is actually realized
in the well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma game, where de-
fectors reign supreme (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
Relaxing the inevitability of a social downfall consti-
tuted by the well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma is the snow-
drift or hawk-dove game (Maynard Smith and Price,
1973), where mutual defection is individually less fa-
vorable than a cooperation-defection pair-up. Accord-
ingly, the snowdrift game allows for stable coexis-
tence of cooperators and defectors in well-mixed pop-
ulations (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). Completing the
triplet is the stag-hunt game (Skyrms, 2004), which
together with the prisoner’s dilemma and the snow-
drift game, forms the standard set of social dilemmas
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that is frequently explored in the current literature [see
e.g. Macy and Flache (2002); Santos et al. (2006b);
Szolnoki and Perc (2009c); Roca et al. (2009a)]. Com-
pared with the prisoner’s dilemma, the stag-hunt game
offers more support for cooperative individuals in that
the reward for mutual cooperation is higher than the
temptation to defect. Still, cooperation in the stag-hunt
game is compromised by the fact that mutual defection
is individually more beneficial than being an exploited
cooperator, as recently highlighted by Pacheco et al.
(2009).
An important realization by the pursuit of cooper-
ation in the context of social dilemmas was the fact
that the outcome of evolutionary games in structured
populations can be very different from the well-mixed
case. In a pioneering work, Nowak and May (1992)
showed that the introduction of spatial structure via
nearest neighbor interactions enabled the cooperators to
form clusters on the square lattice and so protect them-
selves against the exploitation by defectors. Following
this discovery, the impact of the spatial structure on
the evolution of cooperation has been investigated in
detail (Nowak and May, 1993; Huberman and Glance,
1993; Nowak et al., 1994a; Lindgren and Nordahl,
1994; Nowak et al., 1994b; Durrett, 1994; Grim,
1995; Killingback and Doebeli, 1996; Nakamaru et al.,
1997; Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998; Brauchli et al., 1999;
Szabo´ et al., 2000; Tanimoto and Sagara, 2007;
Alonso-Sanz, 2009; Newth and Cornforth, 2009), and
the subject has since been reviewed comprehensively on
different occasions (Hauert, 2002; Doebeli and Hauert,
2005; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007; Roca et al., 2009a).
Notably, the theoretical conjecture that spatial struc-
ture may promote cooperation, or at least sustain a
multitude of competing strategies has been confirmed
experimentally (Kerr et al., 2002), but there also exist
evidences that spatial structure may not necessarily
favor cooperation (Hauert and Doebeli, 2004). Since
the impact of the spatial structure on the evolution of
cooperation depends on the governing social dilemma,
and due to the difficulties associated with the payoff
rankings in experimental and field work (Milinski et al.,
1997; Turner and Chao, 1999), it is certainly good
practice to test new mechanisms aimed at promoting
cooperation on different evolutionary games.
The recent shift from evolutionary games on regular
grids to evolutionary games on complex networks
[for the latter see e.g. Albert and Baraba´si (2002);
Newman (2003); Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003);
Boccaletti et al. (2006)] can be considered a step
towards more realistic conditions. Indeed, the shift is
by no means trivial and bears fascinating results, as
recently reviewed by Szabo´ and Fa´th (2007). Quite
remarkably, scale-free networks (Baraba´si and Albert,
1999) turned out to sustain cooperation by all three
above-described social dilemmas (Santos and Pacheco,
2005; Santos et al., 2006b,c), owing predominantly
to the heterogeneity that characterizes their degree
distribution. Following this seminal discovery, several
studies have since elaborated on different aspects of
cooperation on scale-free networks, as for example
its dynamical organization (Go´mez-Garden˜es et al.,
2007; Pusch et al., 2008), evolution under clustering
(Assenza et al., 2008), mixing patterns (Rong et al.,
2007), memory (Wang et al., 2006) and payoff nor-
malization (Santos and Pacheco, 2006; Masuda,
2007; Wu et al., 2007; Szolnoki et al., 2008b), as
well as its robustness in general (Poncela et al.,
2007; Chen et al., 2008a) and under intentional
attack and error (Perc, 2009). The body of liter-
ature devoted to the study of evolutionary games
on complex network is extensive, aside from the
scale-free architecture hosting the prisoner’s dilemma
(Pacheco and Santos, 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006;
Tang et al., 2006; Y.-S. Chen and Wu, 2007; Du et al.,
2008; Go´mez-Garden˜es et al., 2008; Florı´a et al.,
2009; Li et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2009b) and the
snowdrift game (Wang et al., 2006; Lee et al.,
2008; Roca et al., 2009b), covering also small-
world (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Kim et al.,
2002; Masuda and Aihara, 2003; Tomochi, 2004;
Santos et al., 2005; Zhong et al., 2006; Tomassini et al.,
2006; Fu et al., 2007c; Chen and Wang, 2008;
Yang et al., 2008), social as well as other real-world
networks (Holme et al., 2003; Lieberman et al., 2005;
Vukov and Szabo´, 2005; Wu et al., 2006a; Chen et al.,
2007; Fu et al., 2007b; Luthi et al., 2008; Lozano et al.,
2008; Liu et al., 2009; Luthi et al., 2009). Notably,
the impact of different interaction topologies has also
been studied for evolutionary games outside the realm
of the above-described social dilemmas. Examples
include the rock-paper-scissors game (Szabo´ et al.,
2004; Szo¨llo˝si and Dere´nyi, 2008), the ultimatum game
(Kuperman and Risau-Gusman, 2008) or the public
goods game (Yang et al., 2009c), and indeed many
more studies of the latter games on complex network
are expected in the near future.
Besides the conditions generated by spatiality
and complex interaction networks, many different
mechanisms have been identified that can promote
or otherwise affect the evolution of cooperation, and
we mention them here briefly. Aside from network
reciprocity inherent to games on graphs and complex
networks, other prominent rules promoting coopera-
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tive behavior are kin selection (Hamilton, 1964a,b),
direct reciprocity (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981;
Brandt and Sigmund, 2006; Pacheco et al., 2008),
indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b;
Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Brandt and Sigmund, 2004;
Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Tanimoto, 2007c) and
group selection (Dugatkin and Mesterton-Gibbons,
1996; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Traulsen et al.,
2008), as recently reviewed in (Nowak, 2006b).
Moreover, voluntary participation (Hauert et al.,
2002; Szabo´ and Hauert, 2002a,b; Semmann et al.,
2003; Hauert and Szabo´, 2003; Szabo´ and Vukov,
2004; Wu et al., 2005; Hauert et al., 2007; Chen et al.,
2008c), social diversity (Perc and Szolnoki, 2008;
Santos et al., 2008), asymmetric influence of links and
partner selection (Kim et al., 2002; Wu et al., 2006b),
heterogeneous teaching activity (Szolnoki and Szabo´,
2007; Szolnoki et al., 2008c), and the impact of long-
term learning (Wang et al., 2008) have been suggested
as interesting possibilities that may emerge in real-life
systems. The necessary overlap between interaction
and replacement graphs (Ohtsuki et al., 2007a,b;
Wu and Wang, 2007) has also been recognized as an
important agonist in the evolution of cooperation. Fur-
thermore, the importance of time scales in evolutionary
dynamics (Pacheco et al., 2006b; Roca et al., 2006;
Pacheco et al., 2006a), the role of finite population
size (Nowak et al., 2004; Traulsen et al., 2005, 2006),
and the impact of noise and uncertainties on evolution
in general (Nowak et al., 1995; Traulsen et al., 2004;
Szabo´ et al., 2005; Perc, 2006b; Perc and Marhl, 2006;
Perc, 2006a,c; Vukov et al., 2006; Tanimoto, 2007b;
Perc, 2007b; Ren et al., 2007; Perc and Szolnoki, 2007)
have been investigated as well. Very recently, random
explorations of strategies (Traulsen et al., 2009) and
simultaneous adoptions of different strategies depend-
ing on the opponents (Wardil and da Silva, 2009) have
also been identified as potent promoters of cooperation.
Some of these mechanisms will be described more
accurately in the subsequent sections, but otherwise the
reader is referred to the original works for details.
In the focus of this mini review are evolution-
ary games with coevolutionary rules. Initiated by
Zimmermann et al. (2001) and by Ebel and Bornholdt
(2002b), and in some sense motivated by then very
vibrant advances in network growth and evolution
(Strogatz, 2001; Albert and Baraba´si, 2002), the subject
has evolved into a mushrooming avenue of research that
offers new ways of ensuring cooperation in situations
constituting a social dilemma. Coevolutionary rules
constitute a natural upgrade of evolutionary games since
in reality not only do the strategies evolve in time, but
so does the environment, and indeed many other factors
that in turn affect back the outcome of the evolution
of strategies. Coevolutionary rules can affect the links
players make (or brake) (Ebel and Bornholdt, 2002b;
Zimmermann et al., 2004; Zimmermann and Eguı´luz,
2005; Equı´luz et al., 2005; Pacheco et al., 2006a,b;
Santos et al., 2006a; Hanaki et al., 2007; Biely et al.,
2007; Li et al., 2007; Tanimoto, 2007a; Fu et al.,
2007a; Szolnoki et al., 2008a; Pacheco et al., 2008;
Perc et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008b; Pestelacci et al.,
2008; Van Segbroeck et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2008,
2009b; Kun and Scheuring, 2009; Szolnoki and Perc,
2009c; Tanimoto, 2009a,b; Van Segbroeck et al., 2009;
Gra¨ser et al., 2009) (see Section 3.1), the size of the net-
work (or population) (Ren et al., 2006; Poncela et al.,
2008, 2009) (see Section 3.2), the teaching activity
(or reproduction capability) (Szolnoki and Perc, 2008,
2009b) (see Section 3.3) and mobility of players
(Majeski et al., 1999; Vainstein and Arenzon, 2001;
Vainstein et al., 2007; Helbing and Yu, 2008, 2009;
Meloni et al., 2009; Droz et al., 2009) (see Sec-
tion 3.4), their age (McNamara et al., 2008; Stark et al.,
2008a,b; Szolnoki et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2009a)
(see Section 3.5), as well as several other factors
(Kirchkamp, 1999; Gintis, 2003; Axelrod et al.,
2004; Hamilton and Taborsky, 2005; Fort, 2008a;
Hatzopoulos and Jensen, 2008; Ding et al., 2009;
Moyano and Sa´nchez, 2009; Scheuring, 2009;
Rankin and Taborsky, 2009; Szabo´ et al., 2009)
(see Section 3.6) that eventually affect the outcome
of the underlying evolutionary game. Although the
majority of coevolutionary rules studied so far affects
the network architecture and size, it is important to dis-
tinguish these studies from previous, partially closely
related works where networks also change or evolve in
the course of time (Caldarelli et al., 1998; Pfeiffer et al.,
2005; Holme and Ghostal, 2006; Gross and Blasius,
2008; Castellano et al., 2009); in particularly so, since
the term ‘coevolution’ has in the past been used quite
frequently and for rather different processes.
In the continuation of this paper we will review re-
cent advances on evolutionary games with coevolution-
ary rules, affecting, as mentioned above, the interaction
network, the reproduction capability of players, their
reputation, mobility or age, more thoroughly. Before
that, however, we give in Section 2 a more technical de-
scription of the evolutionary games and strategy adop-
tion rules that we will encounter throughout the paper.
Following the main body of the review given in Sec-
tion 3, we conclude our work and give an outlook in
Section 4.
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2. Evolutionary games
As noted in the first paragraph of Section 1, the three
main social dilemmas involving pairwise interactions
are constituted by the prisoner’s dilemma game, the
snowdrift game and the stag-hunt game. At least one
of these three games is employed in the majority of the
works we will review below, and hence we give a more
accurate description of them in what follows.
Irrespective of which game applies, players can
choose either to cooperate or to defect. Notably, other
strategies, such as loners [see e.g. Hauert and Szabo´
(2005)] or punishers [see e.g. Dreber et al. (2008)] are
also possible, but their inclusion to evolutionary games
with coevolutionary rules has not yet been considered.
In general, mutual cooperation yields the reward R, mu-
tual defection leads to punishment P, and the mixed
choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and
the defector the temptation T . The standard scaled
parametrization entails designating R = 1 and P = 0
as fixed, while the remaining two payoffs can occupy
−1 ≤ S ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2. Then, if T > R > P > S
we have the prisoner’s dilemma game, T > R > S > P
yields the snowdrift game, and R > T > P > S the stag-
hunt game, as schematically depicted in Fig. 1. With-
out much loss of generality, this parametrization is of-
ten further simplified for the prisoner’s dilemma game,
so that T = b is the only free parameter while R = 1
and P = S = 0 are left constant (thick red line in
Fig. 1). However, since then the condition P > S is not
strictly fulfilled, this version is traditionally referred to
as the weak prisoner’s dilemma game (Nowak and May,
1992). An option is also to use T = b, R = b − c,
P = 0 and S = −c, thus strictly adhering to the pris-
oner’s dilemma payoff ranking T > R > P > S while
still having a single tunable parameter in the form of the
ratio b/c. For the snowdrift game one can, in a simi-
lar fashion, introduce r ∈ [0, 1] such that T = 1 + r
and S = 1 − r [see e.g. Wang et al. (2006)], thereby
again decreasing the effective dimensionality of the pa-
rameter space by one. Note also that r characterizes the
cost-to-benefit ratio (Santos and Pacheco, 2005) and in
fact constitutes a diagonal in the snowdrift quadrant of
the T − S parameter plane, as shown in Fig. 1 by the
dotted blue line. It is worth mentioning that other types
of parametrization of two-strategy games are possible
as well (Tanimoto, 2007a), but we focus on the one pre-
sented above since it is the most widely used, thus en-
abling an efficient comparison of different works.
The most frequently employed setup entails that ini-
tially each player x is designated either as a coopera-
tor (sx = C) or defector (sx = D) with equal prob-
1
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Figure 1: Schematic presentation of the two-dimensional T−S param-
eter plane encompassing the stag-hunt (SH), the prisoner’s dilemma
(PD) and the snowdrift (SD) game. Borders between games are de-
noted by dashed green lines. Dotted blue diagonal depicts the r-
parametrization of the snowdrift game, while the thick red line shows
the span of the weak prisoner’s dilemma game having T = b as the
only main parameter. The upper left quadrant represents the so-called
harmony game (HG). The latter, however, does not constitute a social
dilemma because there cooperation is always the winning strategy.
ability, and is placed on one of the nodes of the net-
work with degree kx. Evolution of the two strategies is
then performed in accordance with a pairwise compari-
son rule, during which players accumulate their payoffs
Πx by playing the game with their neighbors. Subse-
quently, player x tries to enforce its strategy sx on player
y in accordance with some probability W(sx → sy)
to be specified below. During the simulation proce-
dure the player x and one of its neighbors y are cho-
sen randomly, whereby in accordance with the ran-
dom sequential update each player is selected once
on average during N (network size) such elementary
steps, together constituting one full Monte Carlo step
(Newman and Barkema, 1999). Alternatively, players
can be selected sequentially, albeit this may cause artifi-
cial effects. Independently on whether synchronized or
the random sequential update is used, however, the time
evolution is always discrete. The probability of strategy
adoption W(sx → sy) can be defined in several ways.
If the degree kx of all players is the same and does not
change in time, the Fermi function
W(sx → sy) = 11 + exp[(Πy − Πx)/K] (1)
is a viable option, as proposed by Szabo´ and To˝ke
(1998). In Eq. 1 K denotes the amplitude of
noise (Vukov et al., 2006; Ren et al., 2007), or equiv-
alently its inverse (1/K) the so-called intensity of se-
lection (Fudenberg et al., 2006; Traulsen et al., 2007a;
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Altrock and Traulsen, 2009). In the K → 0 limit player
x always succeeds in enforcing its strategy to player y if
only Πx > Πy but never otherwise. For K > 0, however,
strategies performing worse may also be adopted based
on unpredictable variations in payoffs (Perc, 2006b) or
errors in the decision making, for example. Impor-
tantly, if the degree distribution of the interaction net-
work (note that this is a property that may likely change
due to a coevolutionary rule), at any instance of the
game, deviates from the case where all players have the
same degree, the application of the Fermi function may
introduce additional effects since then the impact of the
same value of K effectively varies from one player to
the other. Indeed, if the degree distribution character-
izing the interaction network is heterogeneous, a more
successful player (i.e. having a larger payoff) can pass
its strategy with the probability
W(sx → sy) = (Πx − Πy)/(∆ · kq) (2)
where kq is the largest of the two degrees kx and ky, and
∆ = T − S for the prisoner’s dilemma game, ∆ = T − P
for the snowdrift game and ∆ = R − S for the stag-hunt
game (note that the ranking of payoff elements for each
specific game ensures the positive sign of Eq. 2.) Intro-
duced by Santos and Pacheco (2005), it is still a popu-
lar choice surpassing the difficulties associated with the
Fermi function described above, albeit with the down-
side of being unable to adjust the level of uncertainty by
strategy adoptions.
Finally, we mention another frequently used strat-
egy adoption rule in coevolutionary models; namely
the so-called richest-following (or ‘learning from the
best’) rule (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Hu et al.,
2007; Wu et al., 2007), where the focal player al-
ways imitates the strategy of its most successful neigh-
bor (Zimmermann et al., 2004; Equı´luz et al., 2005;
Li et al., 2007; Tanimoto, 2007a, 2009b). Contrary to
the preceding two strategy adoption rules, the richest-
following is completely deterministic, in fact exercis-
ing the strongest selection between players. Naturally,
there also exist other microscopic strategy adoption
rules, such as the win-stay-lose-shift rule where the fo-
cal player has restricted information on its neighbors,
for which the reader is advised to consult the compre-
hensive review by Szabo´ and Fa´th (2007) for more de-
tails.
We will use the notation introduced above throughout
this work unless explicitly stated otherwise. Also, any
deviations with respect to the employed initial setup,
simulation procedure or the definition of strategy adop-
tion probability will be noted when applicable.
3. Coevolutionary rules
While it is obvious that strategies of players engag-
ing in evolutionary games evolve in time, the fact that
other properties characterizing either their individual at-
tributes or the environment in which the game is staged
may simultaneously evolve as well gained foothold only
in recent years. Yet the preceding transitions from well-
mixed populations to spatial grids and further to com-
plex networks, and in particular their success in explain-
ing the evolution of cooperation, are inviting to further
extensions of the theoretical framework, and indeed, the
introduction of coevolutionary rules seems like the log-
ical next step. It should need little persuasion to ac-
knowledge that links we make with others change in
time, that all of us age, that our roles in life evolve,
and that the society we are part of may itself be sub-
ject to transformations on a global scale. Coevolution-
ary rules aim to integrate these processes into the frame-
work of evolutionary games. Perhaps the biggest chal-
lenge thereby is, how to do this without directly (or ob-
viously) promoting cooperation. For example, if one
introduces a rule that, in the course of time, cooperators
should aim to link only with cooperators and defectors
only with defectors, it should come as no surprise that
such a coevolutionary rule will likely favor the evolu-
tion of cooperation. It is demanding, however, to ex-
plore and identify successful mechanisms that do not
attribute special, not to say fictitious, cognitive skill to
players, and do not use a discriminative set of rules for
every participating strategy. Thus, coming up with plau-
sible coevolutionary rules is not straightforward, and
care must be exercised in order to give both strategies
equal credentials. Simply because a strategy is bad for
social welfare it should not be assumed that the individ-
uals adopting it are less skilful or sly than their oppo-
nents. In fact, rather the opposite seems to apply. For
example, defectors should be assumed being just as skil-
ful by selecting appropriate partners as cooperators.
In the following we will review coevolutionary rules
affecting the interactions between players (Section 3.1),
population growth (Section 3.2), teaching activity (Sec-
tion 3.3), mobility (Section 3.4) and aging (Section 3.5)
of players, as well as related aspects (Section 3.6) of in-
dividual and global characteristics that may affect strat-
egy dominance in evolutionary games.
3.1. Dynamical interactions
Coevolutionary rules frequently affect how players
link with one another and this section reviews examples
thereof. As we have mentioned above, the result of
a game with a partner may influence the durability
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of such a connection. In particular, an unsatisfied
player can easily brake a link to look for a more
beneficial interaction with another partner. Notably,
the network itself does thereby not shrink or grow
in size (for the latter see Section 3.2). Instead, our
aim in this subsection is to explore possible rear-
rangements of an existing network that is driven by
the success of players participating in the governing
evolutionary game. Since coevolutionary rules affect-
ing the interactions between players were proposed
first (Zimmermann et al., 2001; Ebel and Bornholdt,
2002b), the pertaining literature that has accumulated
thus far is rather extensive. Works can be partitioned
into those that employed strategy independent rules
for link adaptations (Szolnoki et al., 2008a; Perc et al.,
2008; Kun and Scheuring, 2009; Tanimoto, 2009a;
Szolnoki and Perc, 2009c) and those that considered
strategies or their performances as factors potentially
affecting the rewiring (Ebel and Bornholdt, 2002b;
Zimmermann et al., 2004; Zimmermann and Eguı´luz,
2005; Equı´luz et al., 2005; Pacheco et al., 2006a,b;
Santos et al., 2006a; Li et al., 2007; Fu et al., 2007a;
Tanimoto, 2007a; Biely et al., 2007; Pacheco et al.,
2008; Van Segbroeck et al., 2008; Pestelacci et al.,
2008; Fu et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008b; Tanimoto,
2009b; Fu et al., 2009b; Van Segbroeck et al., 2009;
Qin et al., 2009). Notably, the latter distinction is
rather crude and sometimes not completely accurate
since the rewiring can be performed based on a
secondary player property, like reputation (Fu et al.,
2008), attractiveness (Chen et al., 2008b) or satisfaction
(Pestelacci et al., 2008), which are typically related
with strategy performance over time. It is indeed pos-
sible to further distinguish the proposed coevolutionary
rules introducing dynamical interactions to those by
which the change of the interaction network is driven
by the urge to increase the payoff of the focal player
directly (Ebel and Bornholdt, 2002b; Santos et al.,
2006a; Biely et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007; Chen et al.,
2008b; Pestelacci et al., 2008; Van Segbroeck et al.,
2008; Tanimoto, 2009b; Gra¨ser et al., 2009), and those
by which the rewiring serves also the increase of the
payoff but on a global scale, i.e. independently of the
payoff of the focal player that is affected by the link
adaptation (Pacheco et al., 2006a,b; Tanimoto, 2007a;
Fu et al., 2007a; Pacheco et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2008,
2009b; Van Segbroeck et al., 2009). In the latter case
it is thus not necessary to calculate the players payoff
prior to rewiring because solely its strategy determines
the ‘life’ of a link.
Summarizing the above, a simplified but useful clas-
sification of interaction-updating rules is presented in
Fig. 2. As suggested in the works mentioned last in the
preceding paragraph, the lifetime of a link may depend
primarily on the strategies of the players that are con-
nected with it (type A). From this point of view it is
straightforward to establish that defector-defector links
are short-lived if compared to cooperator-cooperator
links since the former are not beneficial for neither of
the two involved players, while the later yield mutual
gains for both. The second set of coevolutionary rules
evaluates the payoffs originating from the investigated
link prior to its potential deletion, while the actual re-
moval takes place only if a new neighbor may yield
higher benefits (type B) (Van Segbroeck et al., 2009).
And finally, the third set of coevolutionary rules con-
siders the strategy adoption process as pivotal for de-
ciding which links to delete and which to keep (type
C). An example thereof is that the invaded player looses
all its links except the one with the donor of the new
strategy (Szolnoki and Perc, 2009a,c), as depicted in
Fig. 2(c). There are several real-life situations that
can be modeled by the latter rule. From a biological
viewpoint, the coevolutionary rule can be linked with
an invasion of the subordinate species and the subse-
quent replacement by a newborn of the victor. A sim-
ilar phenomenon can be observed in human societies
when one changes a job. Typically then the links to for-
mer coworkers fade and eventually brake, and new ties
are formed primarily with the coworkers from the new
working place. Notably, it falls within the same logi-
cal set of rules if the player that has successfully passed
its strategy is allowed to increase the number of neigh-
bors that are directly connected to it, as was proposed
by Szolnoki et al. (2008a). It should not be overlooked,
however, that the strategy adoption process, triggering
the deletion and/or addition of links, is itself inherently
routed in the payoff difference of the considered players.
An important feature of coevolutionary rules mold-
ing the interactions among players is also the time
scale separation between link and strategy adaptations,
as reported in (Santos et al., 2006a; Pacheco et al.,
2006a,b; Szolnoki et al., 2008a; Pacheco et al.,
2008; Van Segbroeck et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2008;
Szolnoki and Perc, 2009c; Van Segbroeck et al., 2009;
Szolnoki and Perc, 2009a). As the cited works suggest,
the time scale separation can drastically influence the
final output of coevolutionary games. This effect will
also be discussed in the present review. In what follows,
we will review the coevolutionary rules presented in
some of these works more accurately.
In agreement with the actual time-line we start with
the work of Ebel and Bornholdt (2002b), who pro-
posed a coevolutionary rule in which a randomly cho-
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Figure 2: Comparative plots of representative coevolutionary rules affecting the interactions between players. In all panels cooperators (defectors)
are denoted by green (black) circles. Type A [panel (a)]: By ‘active linking’ the probability to create or to delete a link depends only on its type
(C −C links are marked by solid, C − D links by dashed, and D − D links by dotted lines). Links to be deleted (created) are marked by red (blue)
color. Type B [panel (b)]: Adverse ties are deleted depending on the payoffs collected by the players having opposite interests. Subsequently, the
new link is connected to one of the neighbors of the defeated player. Type C [panel (c)]: Each successful strategy adoption, denoted by a full arrow,
evokes the deletion of links of the invaded player, except from the one with the ‘donor’ of the new strategy.
sen player x is connected to a new neighbor at ran-
dom. If the new link increases the average payoff of
the focal player the latter accepts it and disconnects
from the neighbor it scores worst against. Note that
this coevolutionary rule indirectly favors the establish-
ment of cooperator-cooperator links (this pair-up yields
the highest average payoff) and at the same time facil-
itates the deletion of defector-defector links. The co-
evolutionary rule was paired up with strategy mutation
(Ebel and Bornholdt, 2002a), by which a mutation is ac-
cepted if it yields a higher payoff for player x than the
initial strategy [type B; see Fig. 2(b)]. Starting from a
random network with Poissonian degree distribution, it
was shown that this coevolutionary rule leads to cooper-
ative Nash equilibria in an iterative prisoner’s dilemma
game with the additional property that no agent can im-
prove its payoff by changing its neighborhood. Accord-
ing to the authors, the later may be interpreted as a sort
of ‘network Nash equilibrium’ (Ebel and Bornholdt,
2002b). Notably, this coevolutionary rule also affects
the initial network structure in that the later evolves to
a statistically stationary state with a broad degree distri-
bution, suggesting scale-free behavior and giving rise to
small-world properties, among others.
Following their preceding seminal contribution [see
Zimmermann et al. (2001)], Zimmermann et al. (2004)
proposed a coevolutionary rule affecting only defector-
defector pairs with the motivation that in this pair-up
both players might be better off if searching for a new
partner in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma game
[type A; see Fig. 2(a)]. It was shown that, starting from
a random network with a given average degree and the
richest-following strategy adoption rule, even a small
probability p of searching for a new partner from a
defector-defector configuration may substantially pro-
mote cooperation. Indeed, as low as p = 0.01 were
shown to uphold practically complete cooperator dom-
inance across the whole span of the weak prisoner’s
dilemma game (see Fig. 1). With respect to the network
topology, it was reported that the coevolutionary rule fa-
cilitates the formation of a hierarchical interaction struc-
ture and may also introduce small-world properties if
the search for new partners is constrained to the neigh-
bors of the neighbors. However, unlike as shown by
Ebel and Bornholdt (2002b), the occasional (depending
on p) break-up of defector-defector pairs has not been
found leading to broad or even scale-free degree dis-
tributions. These findings were subsequently extended
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(Zimmermann and Eguı´luz, 2005; Equı´luz et al., 2005),
where it was elaborated on the spontaneous emergence
of cooperators with extremely high payoffs and the im-
portant role of this so-called ‘leaders’ for the global
sustenance of cooperation. As such, these works can
be considered as an important prelude to the realiza-
tion of the fact that scale-free networks constitute an ex-
tremely favorable environment for the evolution of co-
operation irrespective of the governing social dilemma
(Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Santos et al., 2006b).
A simple but still plausible coevolutionary rule af-
fecting links between players has been proposed by
Pacheco et al. (2006a,b). Exemplifying type A class of
interaction updating [see Fig. 2(a)], players adopting ei-
ther the strategy C (cooperate) or D (defect) were des-
ignated a propensity to form new links denoted by αC
and αD, such that xy links were formed at rates αxαy,
where x, y ∈ [C, D]. Moreover, each link was assigned
a specific lifetime depending on the strategy of the two
connected players given by τxy = γ−1xy , where γxy is the
corresponding link death rate. With these definitions
the authors were able to specify mean field equations
governing the so-called active linking dynamics of the
network. This coevolutionary rule has been tested on
the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game subject
to the Fermi function (see Eq. 1) governing the strat-
egy adoption [for additional set-ups see Pacheco et al.
(2006a)]. It was shown that if the time scale associated
with active linking is much smaller than the one asso-
ciated with strategy updating the proposed coevolution-
ary rule leads to an effective rescaling of the governing
payoff matrix, and thus a shift in the played evolution-
ary game. For example, the prisoner’s dilemma game
transforms to the coordination game, while the snow-
drift game transforms to the harmony game [for de-
tails on the coordination game see e.g. Szabo´ and Fa´th
(2007)]. In both cases the cooperation is promoted, in
turn designating the proposed coevolutionary rule as a
simple and analytically tractable means of understand-
ing how selfish and unrelated individuals may be led to
adopting the cooperative strategy. On the other hand, if
the ratio between the time scales associated with active
linking and strategy updating is not small, the interplay
between these two dynamical processes leads to a pro-
gressive crossover between the analytic results obtained
for very fast active linking and the evolutionary dynam-
ics of strategies taking place on static graphs. The latter
were found to exhibit different degrees of heterogeneity
depending on the parameters determining active link-
ing, yet in general complying well with real social net-
works having fast decaying tails in their degree distribu-
tions. Notably, compared to the earlier works reviewed
above, an important observation made in the two papers
by Pacheco et al. (2006a,b) was that the impact of co-
evolutionary rules may depend significantly on the time
scales associated with the strategy and structure (link)
evolution. For example, Zimmermann et al. (2004) too
commented on the time scale separation in their model,
yet the promotion of cooperation was thereby not no-
tably affected [both slow (p ≪ 1) and fast (p → 1)
rewiring of D − D links was found to be highly effec-
tive]. Active linking dynamics has also been investi-
gated in repeated games incorporating direct reciprocity
(Pacheco et al., 2008), where additionally the produc-
tivity of every link connecting two players was evalu-
ated prior to potential rewiring. Moreover, the active
linking model proposed by Pacheco et al. (2006b) was
recently extended by Van Segbroeck et al. (2009) to ac-
count for the impact of different reactions to adverse
ties. In particular, Van Segbroeck et al. (2009) addi-
tionally introduced individual behavioral types of play-
ers through different values of γ, separating those that
tend to break their links frequently (γ close to 1) from
those that tend to break them rarely (γ close to 0). In
this way both topology and strategy dynamics become
interrelated. It was shown that populations in which
individuals are allowed to handle their social contacts
diversely are more prone to cooperative behavior than
those in which such diversity is absent. Similarly as in
Pacheco et al. (2006b), it was shown that by an appro-
priate time scale separation between strategy and net-
work dynamics the diverse behavioral preferences can
also introduce a transformation of the governing social
dilemma, yet so that each individual perceives the same
game differently.
Also building on the time scale separation between
rewiring and strategy updating is another paper by
Santos et al. (2006a), where players are able to decide
which links they want to maintain and which they want
to change based on local information about their neigh-
bors [type B; see Fig. 2(b)]. A link change is initiated
if player x is dissatisfied with its connection to player
y, which is the case if the strategy of player y is to de-
fect. However, player y also assesses the quality of its
link to x in the same fashion. If both x and y are sat-
isfied (which practically means that both are coopera-
tors) the link between them remains intact. If x wants
to remove the link and y not (sx = C and sy = D), the
probability W given by the Fermi function (see Eq. 1)
is invoked. If realized, player x is allowed to redirect
to a random neighbor of y. If not, x stays linked with
y. If both x and y are defectors, and thus both want to
remove the link, then rewiring takes place such that the
new link keeps attached to x with probability W or to y
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with probability 1 −W. Finally, the authors introduce a
ratio defined as the time scale associated with the evolu-
tion of strategies τe (for simplicity equal to one) divided
by the time scale associated with the rewiring of the net-
work τa, showing that there exists a critical value for
this ratio above which cooperators wipe out defectors.
Moreover, the emerging networks exhibit an overall het-
erogeneity that is maximal at the critical value and can
be compared well with diversity associated with realis-
tic social networks. The coevolutionary rule proposed
by Santos et al. (2006a) was extended by allowing indi-
viduals to adjust their social ties (Van Segbroeck et al.,
2008), with the extension that each player was assigned
an individual willingness 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 to rewire unwanted
social interactions. Accordingly, players with small η
can be considered as loyal to their partners and resilient
to change, while those with η → 1 are swift in altering
their links. It was shown that the highest cooperation
levels can be achieved when the propensity to change
links is highly strategy-dependent. More precisely, it
was found very beneficial for the evolution of coopera-
tion if defectors changed their partners frequently while
cooperators behaved oppositely, i.e. kept their partners
for as long as possible. This is indeed expect since de-
fectors are unable to establish social ties under mutual
agreement with their partners. On the other hand, co-
operators are typically much more prone to establishing
long-term relations and loyalty. Ultimately, these two
facts lead to the evolution of heterogeneous interactions
networks where cooperators are known to prevail over
defectors [see e.g. Santos and Pacheco (2005)].
Related to the work of Santos et al. (2006a) is the
recent paper by Fu et al. (2009b), the difference being
that in the latter only cooperators are allowed to switch
their partners if they act as defectors, and moreover, the
new partner is sought randomly from the whole pop-
ulation. It is found that under such a coevolutionary
rule there exists an optimal, rather than critical [com-
pare with Santos et al. (2006a)], time scale separation
between rewiring and strategy updating for which co-
operation thrives best. Also, the resulting interaction
topology is different in that the network typically be-
comes divided into isolated communities of cooperators
and defectors due to the selective coevolutionary rule
targeting only mixed strategy pairs. Notably, a preced-
ing study by Fu et al. (2008) considered partner switch-
ing also with the aid of reputation, which was defined
similar to image scoring proposed a decade earlier by
Nowak and Sigmund (1998b). It was found that coevo-
lutionary switching of partners based on the reputation
of nearest and next-nearest neighbors, i.e. preferen-
tially targeting players with a higher reputation, is sig-
c d
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Figure 3: Multilevel selection at work. In all panels cooperators (de-
fectors) are denoted by green (black) circles. A cooperator, strength-
ened by neighboring cooperators (note that C −C links are beneficial
for all involved), can pass its strategy to a defector that is weakened
by neighboring defectors (panel a). Subsequently, the invaded player
looses its links to other players, except the one with the donor of the
new strategy (panel b). Due to random link additions, the successful
invasion of cooperators will repeat itself sooner or later depending on
τ (panel c), ultimately resulting in the disintegration of the defector
cluster (panel d). Note that this process cannot work in the opposite
direction, i.e. defectors cannot invade a cluster of cooperators. The
necessary condition for this mechanism to work is the emergence of
quasi-homogeneous groups, which occur if strategy adoptions happen
frequently between new link additions, i.e. if τ is large enough.
nificantly more effective in promoting cooperation than
seeking a new partner randomly from the whole popula-
tion. Thus, these results underline the importance of in-
direct reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b) also
when individuals can adjust their social ties.
In addition to the studies reviewed above, similar co-
evolutionary rules were used to study how scale-free
networks emerge in social systems (Li et al., 2007),
how cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game can
be established via the interplay between dynamical in-
teractions and game dynamics (Fu et al., 2007a) or in-
teraction stochasticity (Chen et al., 2008b), how social
dilemmas in general can thereby be resolved (Tanimoto,
2007a; Pestelacci et al., 2008; Tanimoto, 2009b), as
well as other sophisticated models (Hanaki et al., 2007;
Biely et al., 2007) were considered. We refer the
interested reader to the original works for further
details, while here we proceed with the review of
some of the studies that employed strategy indepen-
dent rules for link adaptations (Szolnoki et al., 2008a;
Perc et al., 2008; Kun and Scheuring, 2009; Tanimoto,
9
2009a; Szolnoki and Perc, 2009c).
Belonging to the third type of interaction-updating
coevolutionary rules [type C; see Fig. 2(c)] is the model
proposed by Szolnoki and Perc (2009c), where when-
ever player x adopts a new strategy all its links, ex-
cept from the one with the donor of the new strategy,
are deleted (see Fig. 3), and moreover, all individuals
are allowed to form a new link with a randomly cho-
sen player with which they are not yet connected after
every τ full Monte Carlo steps. Note that the random ad-
ditions of links counteract the deletions following each
strategy adoption, in turn largely preserving the initially
random topology and the heterogeneity of the interac-
tion network (Szolnoki and Perc, 2009a). It was shown
that at a sufficiently large time scale separation between
link deletions and additions, constituted by τ, this co-
evolutionary rules evokes the spontaneous emergence
of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which
despite the persistent random topology of the evolving
network, maintains cooperation across a substantial por-
tion of the T − S parameter plane. Importantly, the pro-
motion of cooperation is thereby not realized by some
final outcome of a coevolutionary rule, as is for exam-
ple the case in (Szolnoki et al., 2008a), but is the conse-
quence of a dynamical processes that affects the adop-
tion of strategies on the macroscopic level of evolution-
ary game dynamics. As Fig. 3 illustrates, the latter man-
ifests as multilevel selection (Wilson and Sober, 1998;
Traulsen and Nowak, 2006) that strongly promotes co-
operation in all major types of social dilemmas.
Conceptually fitting to the third type of interaction-
updating coevolutionary rules [type C; see Fig. 2(c)] is
also the model introduced by Szolnoki et al. (2008a),
where each player x that successfully passes its strat-
egy (i.e. reproduces in a biological scenario) is allowed
to form a new link with one randomly selected neighbor
from its current neighborhood, thereby increasing its de-
gree kx by one. Thus, successful players are allowed
to grow compact large neighborhoods that are centered
around their initial four nearest neighbors. As it is gen-
erally assumed, the payoff of any given player is accu-
mulated from all the links with its neighbors. Hence,
without the normalization by degree, the more links a
player has the higher its payoff is expected to be. For the
sake of an easier depiction of player distributions, we
start from an interaction graph that can be represented
by a square lattice. Evidently, the additions of new links
will drive the initial topology away from two dimen-
sions, yet still allowing us to capture relevant details of
strategy distributions via a square lattice representation,
as shown in Fig. 4. Notably, the coevolutionary rule is
independent on whether sx = C or D, and can hence
Figure 4: Typical distributions of players on a 100×100 grid, obtained
at an optimal (kmax = 50; top panel) and a too large (kmax = 200,
bottom panel) connectivity originating from the coevolutionary rule
proposed by Szolnoki et al. (2008a). Full black (open green) boxes
depict the positions of influential defectors (cooperators) while yellow
(white) pixels depict the players who are within (out of) their range of
influence. If the influential players are separated by large disjunct
territories of influence (bottom panel) the network reciprocity is not
functioning well.
be considered as strategy independent. However, since
the performance of the strategies is clearly definitive for
who gets to make new links, the rule has at least concep-
tual similarities with some of the above-reviewed works
that considered strategies as more directly decisive for
the outcome of dynamical interactions. Since the co-
evolutionary rule would eventually result in a fully con-
nected graph (the latter constitutes well-mixed condi-
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tions), the parameter kmax was introduced as the maxi-
mal degree a player is allowed to obtain. Accordingly,
the process of making new connections is stopped as
soon as the degree k of a single player within the whole
population reaches kmax, whereby this limit prevents the
formation of a homogeneous system and indeed con-
stitutes the main parameter affecting the impact of the
coevolutionary rule. Starting from a square lattice, it
was shown that intermediate values of kmax ≈ 50 sub-
stantially promote cooperation in the weak prisoner’s
dilemma game (see Fig. 1) governed by Eq. 2, which
was attributed to the formation of highly heterogeneous
interactions networks ensuring optimal transfer of in-
formation between influential players, i.e. those that
have the highest degree among any other players that
can adopt the strategy from the influential player via an
elementary process. The coevolutionary rule was also
tested against robustness to time scale separation be-
tween neighborhood growth and strategy adoption via
the introduction of a parameter q, defining the probabil-
ity of degree extension after a successful strategy pass.
Evidently, q = 1 recovers the originally proposed model
while decreasing values of q result in increasingly sep-
arated time scales. Although the impact of q was found
depending somewhat on the temptation to defect b, in
general values of q > 0.2 yielded insignificantly differ-
ent results if compared to the q = 1 case. Note that q = 0
corresponds to the spatial model without coevolution,
and hence it is natural that as q → 0 the promotion of
cooperation was found fading. The success of interme-
diate values of kmax in promoting cooperation can be ex-
plained based on the emergence of heterogeneous inter-
action networks and the disassortative mixing of high-
degree nodes (Rong et al., 2007; Tanimoto, 2009a). In
particular, while intermediate values of kmax result in a
highly degree-diverse mixture of players, which gener-
ally promotes cooperation [see also Santos and Pacheco
(2005)], too large values of kmax yield just a few influ-
ential players with disjunct clouds of homogeneous re-
gions surrounding them, as shown in the bottom panel
of Fig. 4. In the later case, the lack of information ex-
change between hubs (influential players having large
degree) defectors can easily survive, thus resulting only
in moderate cooperation levels. The top panel of Fig. 4,
on the other hand, features an optimal distribution of in-
fluential players (i.e. those having large degree), where
high-degree cooperators can make cooperation prevail
practically across the whole system.
It is worth mentioning that the optimal level of co-
operation observed for an intermediate value of kmax
in Szolnoki et al. (2008a) is conceptually similar to the
case when an intermediate strength of information ex-
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Figure 5: Fraction of cooperators ρC as a function of p in the ‘con-
nected influential players’ model (Perc et al., 2008). Parameter p de-
termines the intensity of the information exchange between influential
players. The fraction of influential players is µ = 0.12 and the temp-
tation to defect is b = 2. The line is just to guide the eye.
change between influential players yields the optimal
environment for cooperation (Perc et al., 2008), as is
illustrated in Fig. 5. In the later case a fraction µ
of players that are characterized with a larger teach-
ing capability are allowed to temporarily link with dis-
tant opponents of the same kind with probability p,
thus introducing shortcut connections among the distin-
guished. These additional temporary connections are
able to sustain cooperation throughout the whole range
of the temptation to defect b (see Fig. 1). As Fig. 5
demonstrates, only minute values of p, constituting a
moderate intensity of information exchange between in-
fluential players, warrant the best promotion of cooper-
ation.
Strategy-independent coevolutionary rules affecting
the interactions between players have also been con-
sidered in the context of distinguished players populat-
ing a square lattice (Perc et al., 2008), in the context of
dynamically changing random and scale-free networks
(Kun and Scheuring, 2009), as well as in the context
of random networks with different assortative mixing
emerging due to links adaptations (Tanimoto, 2009a).
Again, the interested reader is referred to the original
works for further details, while here we proceed with
a new section devoted to the review of coevolutionary
rules introducing network growth.
3.2. Population growth
First, it is worth noting that coevolutionary rules
giving rise to population growth have been consid-
ered much less frequently than the above-reviewed
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rules affecting solely how players link with one an-
other. Indeed, only three works fit into this subsec-
tion, the latter being the arXiv contribution by Ren et al.
(2006) and two recent papers by Poncela et al. (2008,
2009). Closely related to the rather general and broad
interest in network growth (Gross and Blasius, 2008;
Castellano et al., 2009), the networks formed by the
players participating in evolutionary games can be sub-
ject to growth as well, with motivations equivalent to
those of the broader research field.
Although never officially published, the work by
Ren et al. (2006) should be acknowledged as being pi-
oneering in raising the question how the dynamics of
an evolutionary game might affect network growth, and
how in turn the latter affects back the prevalence of the
competing strategies. For this purpose, the authors pro-
posed a so-called payoff-based preferential attachment
rule under the guidance of the r-parameterized snow-
drift game (see Fig. 1) and the Fermi strategy adoption
rule given by Eq. 1. Indeed, the preferential attachment
rule by Ren et al. (2006) is practically identical to the
seminal growth and preferential attachment model pro-
posed by Baraba´si and Albert (1999), only that in the
former the probability of linking a new player to an ex-
isting player x is not determined by its degree kx but
rather by its accumulated payoff until that time. Not
surprisingly then (note that in the absence of normaliza-
tion, similarly as the degree of a player, its payoff will
typically also increase by one during an update), the co-
evolutionary rule was found leading to the emergence
of scale-free interaction networks that are characterized
by the degree distribution P(k) ∝ k−γ; the coefficient
γ thereby depending on the scaling of the probability of
linking a new player to an existing player. In accordance
with an earlier study by Santos and Pacheco (2005), the
emerging scale-free topology due to the coevolutionary
rule was found highly beneficial for the evolution of co-
operation in the snowdrift game. Notably, the authors
also investigated the average path length and the as-
sortative mixing of the emerging networks, as well as
the wealth distribution of players. The former two were
found to be in agreement with observations from realis-
tic social networks, while the latter was found consistent
with the Pareto law.
The work by Poncela et al. (2008) also introduces an
evolutionary preferential attachment rule that is based
on the payoffs of existing players, albeit the weak pris-
oner’s dilemma is employed as the governing game and
the strategy adoption probability is quantified according
to Eq. 2. More precisely, the network growth starts with
m0 = 3 fully connected players and proceeds by adding
a new player with m = 2 links to the existing ones at
equally spaced time intervals τT . The probability that
any player x, (having payoffΠx) in the network receives
one of the m new links was defined as
px(t) = 1 − ǫ + ǫΠx(t)∑
y[1 − ǫ + ǫΠy(t)]
(3)
where the sum runs over all the players forming the
network at time t. Moreover, the parameter ǫ ∈
[0, 1) controls the weight of the payoffs during the net-
work growth. For ǫ = 0 all nodes are equiprob-
able, corresponding to the weak selection limit [see
e.g. Traulsen et al. (2007b); Wild and Traulsen (2007);
Fu et al. (2009a) for recent works related to the latter],
while for ǫ → 1 the players with the highest payoffs
are much more likely to attract the newcomers. The au-
thors also specified the time interval τD for payoff evalu-
ations and potential strategy adoptions, focusing explic-
itly on τD/τT > 1 (typically ≈ 10, although smaller and
larger values were also commented on), so that accord-
ingly the network growth was considered to be faster
than the evolutionary dynamics. It was shown that the
weak selection limit results in networks having degree
distributions with exponentially decaying tails, while
the strong selection limit (ǫ → 1) yields highly het-
erogeneous scale-free interaction networks. In agree-
ment with the earlier findings obtained on static graphs
(Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007), it was confirmed that higher
levels of cooperation are attainable on heterogeneous
rather than homogeneous topologies, albeit that the dis-
tribution of strategies with respect to the degree of nodes
forming the network is different. More precisely, co-
operators were not found occupying the main hubs as
on static graphs, but rather the nodes with an inter-
mediate degree, thus indicating that the interplay be-
tween the local structure of the network and the hier-
archical organization of cooperation is guided by the
competition between the network growth and the evo-
lutionary dynamics. Notably, similar differences in the
microscopic organization of the steady state composi-
tion of strategies were found on static scale-free net-
works when the payoffs were subjected to normaliza-
tion (Szolnoki et al., 2008b), although the discrepancies
reported by Poncela et al. (2008) were solely the conse-
quence of the coevolutionary growth process. Indeed,
in a recent study Poncela et al. (2009) this coevolution-
ary rule has been studied further to confirm that the
reported promotion of cooperation hinges not only on
the final heterogeneity of the resulting network but also
vitally on the particularities of the growth process it-
self. In addition, it was shown that under strongly pay-
off dominated growth conditions so-called super-hubs
can emerge, which attract most of the links from the
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other nodes. Although under such conditions coopera-
tion was found thriving even for high temptations to de-
fect, it was also noted that the robustness of these find-
ings may be compromised, or at least not so strong as
on static scale-free networks (Poncela et al., 2007), due
to the extreme heterogeneity of the star-like structures
that can be brought about by the coevolutionary network
growth.
With the above we conclude the review of coevo-
lutionary rules affecting the interaction network, ei-
ther in terms of links players form with one another
(see Section 3.1 above) or the actual number of play-
ers participating in the game and the related network
size. We proceed with the review of coevolutionary
rules affecting individual properties of players, such as
their teaching activity (see Section 3.3), mobility (see
Section 3.4) or age (see Section 3.5). Note, however,
that some of the above-reviewed coevolutionary rules
already incorporated and/or affected personal features
of players, such as for example the loyalty to their
partners (Van Segbroeck et al., 2008, 2009) or influence
(Perc et al., 2008), albeit always in conjunction with the
coevolution of the interaction network. In what follows,
the links and the size of the network are not affected by
the coevolutionary rules unless explicitly noted other-
wise.
3.3. Evolving teaching activity
Heterogeneity of players has been explored as
a beneficial condition for cooperation in several
forms (Wu et al., 2006b; Perc and Szolnoki, 2008; Fort,
2008b; Masuda, 2008). It can be easily accepted that
players are not perfectly identical within a population.
Some have higher reputation or stronger influence than
others. These differences can be detected via a bi-
ased direction of strategy adoptions. More precisely,
players with higher reputation can spread their strategy
more easily than if having an average or low reputa-
tion. In other words, their activity to teach a neigh-
bor a new strategy is higher. It turned out that one of
the individual quantities that influences the evolution
of cooperation most effectively is the teaching activity
(Szolnoki and Szabo´, 2007). Notably, teaching activity
can also be referred to as the influence or reproduction
rate (Szolnoki et al., 2008c), with the logical assump-
tion that influential individuals are much more likely
to reproduce, i.e. have a higher teaching activity, than
players with low influence. Teaching activity (or the
synonyms we pointed out) can be introduced into the
framework of evolutionary game theory via a modified
Figure 6: Coevolution of teaching activity during a strategy adoption,
as proposed by Szolnoki and Perc (2008). The teaching activity of the
left player, which is proportional with the size of circle, increases due
to the successful strategy pass. Note that the right player adopts the
strategy from the left player, hence the change of color from green
to black. This strategy-independent (note that the teaching activity of
the left player increases irrespective of which strategy was passed to
the right player) coevolutionary rule can result in highly heterogenous
distributions of teaching activity (see Fig. 7), which were found ben-
eficial for the evolution of cooperation irrespective of the underlying
interaction network.
Fermi strategy adoption rule
W(sx → sy) = wx 11 + exp[(Πy − Πx)/K] (4)
where wx characterizes the strength of influence (or
teaching activity) of player x. Obviously, wx = 1 for all
x returns Eq. 1, whereby it is important to acknowledge
that even if wx < 1 but the same for all x the evolution-
ary outcome of strategy abundance remains the same,
only the relaxation times lengthen. Quenched (non-
evolving) distributions of wx may promote cooperation
even on homogenous lattice-type interaction topologies
(Szolnoki and Szabo´, 2007), while their application on
complex networks reveals further that players with large
teaching activity play a similar role as hubs in highly de-
gree heterogenous graphs, such as scale-free networks
(Szolnoki et al., 2008c). We refer the reader to the orig-
inal works for further details on models using quenched
distributions of wx, while here we proceed with the
review of the two papers by Szolnoki and Perc (2008,
2009b) that thus far considered the teaching activity as
an evolving property of individual players.
In a social context the strategy adoption can be con-
sidered as learning from the more successful player. Ac-
cepting this point of view, it is straightforward to con-
sider a player who has successfully passed a strategy as
the one having a higher reputation, and thus a higher
teaching activity than other players. Implementing this
idea into a coevolutionary rule, we proposed that when-
ever player x successfully passes its strategy the influ-
ence wx increases by a constant positive value ∆w ≪ 1
according to wx → wx + ∆w (Szolnoki and Perc, 2008).
This coevolutionary rule is illustrated in Fig. 6. It should
be noted that in this model the term ‘reputation’ does
not necessarily have a positive meaning, and thus may
be in contradiction with the same term used elsewhere
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(Fu et al., 2008), where players who cooperated were
awarded a higher reputation, which expectedly yielded
higher levels of cooperation.
Moreover, for the sake of simplicity it was assumed
that the evolution of w stops as soon as the highest wx
reaches 1 (Szolnoki and Perc, 2008). Starting from a
nonpreferential setup, initially assigning wx = 0.01 to
every player irrespective of its strategy, it was found that
there exists an optimal intermediate value of ∆w ≈ 0.07
for which cooperation in the weak prisoner’s dilemma
as well as the r-parameterized snowdrift game (see
Fig. 1) is enhanced best. It is in fact understandable
that only an intermediate value of the increment∆w was
found warranting the optimal heterogeneity of the dis-
tribution of wx. Namely, if ∆w is small then the values
of wx simply increase homogeneously for all the play-
ers, while large values of ∆w result in a very quick halt
of the coevolutionary process, either way resulting in a
rather homogeneous distribution of the teaching activ-
ity. Indeed, for both considered evolutionary games it
was found that using moderate ∆w the final distribution
of w is exponential, in turn attributing the promotion of
cooperation to the spontaneously emerging highly het-
erogenous plethora of differently influential players, as
shown in Fig. 7. It was also shown that the effective-
ness of the coevolutionary rule increases with the in-
creasing uncertainty by strategy adoptions K, and that
the rule is robust to variations of the updating scheme.
For example, it was verified that an alternative coevo-
lutionary rule, by which wx was allowed to grow also
past 1 only that then wx was normalized according to
wx →
wx
wmax
(wmax > 1 being the maximal out of all wx
at any given time) to ensure that the teaching activity
remained bounded to the unit interval, yielded similar
results as the halted version.
A two-fold extension of the above work was made
in Szolnoki and Perc (2009b). First, the coevolutionary
rule was no longer considered to be strategy indepen-
dent. Note that in the preceding work wx → wx + ∆w
was executed irrespective of the strategy of player x.
Conversely, in Szolnoki and Perc (2009b) this rule was
applied separately either only for sx = C (coopera-
tors) or only for sx = D (defectors). Second, the evo-
lution of cooperation was examined in all three major
social dilemma types defined on the T − S parameter
plane (see Fig. 1). It was shown that both versions of
the coevolutionary rule promote cooperation irrespec-
tive of the underlying game. Opposite to intuitive rea-
soning, however, it was revealed that the exclusive co-
evolutionary promotion of players spreading defection
is more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise di-
rect promotion of cooperators. This was attributed to
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Figure 7: Spontaneously emerging heterogeneous distribution of the
teaching activity P(wx) as a result of the coevolutionary rule intro-
duced by Szolnoki and Perc (2008). Results were obtained for the
weak prisoner’s dilemma game staged on a square lattice. Parameter
values were: b = 1.05, K = 0.1 and ∆w = 0.07.
the fact that the coevolutionary promotion of defectors
results in a larger fraction of players that are at least
once affected by the coevolution, ultimately leading to a
stronger segregation of the population into active (those
having wx > 0.01; note that the latter is the initial teach-
ing activity assigned to all) and virtually (or compa-
rably) inactive (those having wx = 0.01) players than
the coevolutionary rule affecting cooperators. Accord-
ing to previous findings on the impact of static distri-
butions of heterogeneity (Perc and Szolnoki, 2008), the
stronger expressed segregation was found directly re-
sponsible for the better promotion of cooperation when
defectors rather than cooperators were subjected to co-
evolution.
As we have already mentioned (see e.g. Section 3.1),
the time scale separation of coevolutionary processes
may decisively affect the final output of such models.
This was observed for the coevolution of teaching ac-
tivity as well. More precisely, the time scale separa-
tion between the coevolution of teaching activity and
strategy adoption can be tuned via the introduction of
a parameter q, defining the probability of increasing wx
after a successful strategy pass. Evidently, q = 1 recov-
ers the two originally proposed models while decreasing
values of q result in increasingly separated time scales.
Although the impact of q was found depending some-
what on the type of the considered coevolutionary rule,
in general, values of q > 0.3 yielded insignificantly dif-
ferent results if compared to the q = 1 case, thus indicat-
ing that the findings are robust to this type of alterations
[note that, as in Szolnoki et al. (2008a), q = 0 corre-
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sponds to the model without coevolution, and hence it is
natural that as q → 0 the promotion of cooperation was
found fading]. More precisely, however, since the frac-
tion of cooperators was found increasing rather steadily
with increasing values of q, especially for the coevo-
lutionary rule affecting defectors, it is optimal to keep
the coevolutionary process affecting the teaching activ-
ity of players paced similarly fast as the main evolution
of strategies, i.e. q → 1.
We thus emphasize, that the above-reviewed coevo-
lutionary models affecting the teaching activity have re-
vealed that a simple ‘successful become more success-
ful’ principle can result in a heterogenous hierarchy of
individual properties of players, such that optimal con-
ditions for the evolution of cooperation are warranted. A
similarly positive impact of heterogeneity on the spread
of the cooperative strategy was also detected on het-
erogenous interaction networks (Santos and Pacheco,
2005), hence conceptually linking these two seemingly
disjoint promoters of cooperation.
3.4. Mobility of players
It was acknowledged already by Majeski et al. (1999)
that players finding themselves in an unprofitable or un-
desirable situation frequently choose moving in order to
free themselves from the negative consequences of that
situation. Accordingly, mobility can be considered as
being a coevolutionary process in the sense of strategy
and/or position alterations that ultimately determine the
environment of players. Although we were unable to lo-
cate coevolutionary terminology associated with mobil-
ity, we review here advances on this topic made during
the last decade, and indeed consider movements of play-
ers during the evolution of strategies as being guided by
rules of coevolution.
The impact of diffusion on the outcome of a spa-
tial prisoner’s dilemma game via empty sites was ques-
tioned first by Vainstein and Arenzon (2001). Therein,
weak quenched disorder introduced in the form of
empty sites on a square lattice was found beneficial for
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game subject to
the richest-following strategy update rule. In a follow-
up paper (Vainstein et al., 2007) the approach was ex-
tended to allow diffusion of players to nearest-neighbor
empty sites with a certain probability. In particular,
two ways of implementing the mobility were consid-
ered. First, each player was allowed to make an attempt
at moving only after payoff accumulation and potential
strategy adaptations were executed in parallel, or sec-
ond, the moving was attempted prior to the evolution of
strategies. Importantly, the moving of players was con-
sidered to be Brownian random walk like, i.e. diffusive,
not relying on any type of explicit, genotypic or pheno-
typic assortment, and also being strategy-independent.
Due to this minimalist set-up the study provided rather
general insights into possible effects of mobility. It was
shown that mobility may indeed promote cooperation
since it increases the ability of cooperator clusters to in-
vade and overtake isolated defectors. On the other hand,
mobility may also allow defectors to escape retaliation
from a former partner and lead to stronger mixing in a
population due to increasing interaction ranges of play-
ers, both of which are known to damp the evolutionary
success of cooperators. Thus, the impact of mobility
in the form introduced by Vainstein et al. (2007) is not
clear cut. As noted by the authors, further work on this
is in progress. Importantly, it was also emphasized that
mobility may be subject to more deliberate coevolution-
ary rules, taking into account personal preferences of
players, their strategies, as well as aims.
An example of the latter was studied by
Helbing and Yu (2009), who introduced success-
driven migration as a possible mediator leading towards
cooperation in populations of selfish and unrelated
individuals even under noisy conditions. In particular,
success-driven migration [see also Helbing and Yu
(2008)] was implemented so that, before the strategy
adoption, player x was allowed to explore potential
payoffs that it would receive if occupying one of the
empty sites in the migration neighborhood. The latter
was typically restrained to nearest and next-nearest
neighbors of player x. If the potential payoff was
found to be higher than in the current location, player
x moved to the site offering the highest payoff and, in
case of several sites with the same payoff, to the closest
one. On the other hand, if the current location offered
the highest payoff among all the empty sites within
the migration neighborhood, player x did not move.
It was found that this fairly simple and very plausible
migration rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma game on a square lattice (with a fraction of
empty sites to accommodate moving) irrespective of
the noise introduced to the system. In fact, three types
of noise were considered to attest to the robustness of
cooperation facilitation due to the introduced mobility
of players. First was the introduction of mutation with
probability q, second was the introduction of random
movements not considering the expected success (pay-
off) with probability r, while third was the combination
of the two. Additionally, different update rules, adding
birth and death processes, as well as introducing a small
fraction of individuals defecting unconditionally were
considered as well. Irrespective of all these factors
cooperation was found prevailing in a large region of
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the parameter space defining the prisoner’s dilemma
game if only the players were allowed to execute
success-driven migration.
Recently, mobility is getting increasing attention as
a means to promote cooperation in social dilemmas
(Droz et al., 2009; Meloni et al., 2009). In the model of
Droz et al. (2009) two types of players are introduced,
and a random walk of the influential individuals is pos-
sible irrespective of their strategies. The mobility of in-
fluential cooperators can have two positive impacts on
the evolution of cooperation. First, they can spread the
cooperative strategy among the non-influential players
having a lower teaching activity, and second, when two
influential players with opposite strategies meet, the co-
operator can prevail and thus ensure an effective infor-
mation exchange between cooperating hubs. Note that
the importance of the latter has as already been empha-
sized in Section 3.1 (see e.g. Fig. 5 and the pertaining
text). As expected based on preceding works consider-
ing mobility as a coevolutionary process, the final out-
come of the competition between mobile, and thus in-
fluential, cooperators and defectors is highly sensitive
to changes in the speed of moving. When the latter is
too high the influential cooperators cannot benefit from
their cooperative neighborhoods because they abandon
them too soon. Similarly, influential defectors eschew
the negative feedback effect originating from defecting
neighbors (note that D − D links are nonprofitable for
both players) because they leave them too fast as well.
Indeed, high moving speeds generate conditions mim-
icking the well-mixed regime which is damning for co-
operators. Thus, only moderate mobility of influential
players has been found effectively supporting the evolu-
tion of cooperation. We refer the reader to the original
works for further details, noting that mobility seems a
promising avenue of research for future explorations of
coevolutionary rules.
3.5. Aging of players
As the last coevolutionary process we consider ag-
ing. Indeed, aging is always present, tailoring our in-
teractions with others and postulating a finite lifespan
during which we are able to exercise them. It thus
seems natural to consider aging as an integral part of ev-
ery evolutionary development, and certainly evolution-
ary games constitute a prime example thereof. Nonethe-
less, studies taking aging explicitly into account within
this realm of research are few. McNamara et al. (2008)
recently noted that lifespan might play an important role
in the evolution of cooperation, albeit their study fo-
cused on the coevolution of choosiness (see also Sec-
tion 3.6) rather than age. Moreover, concepts similar
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Figure 8: Dynamical explanation of cooperation promotion emerging
due to aging, as proposed by Szolnoki et al. (2009). When an old de-
fector, with a high strategy transfer capability, is imitated by one of
the neighbors, further spreading of defection is blocked because the
newborn defector has no chance to pass strategy D further. The new-
born is not supported by its ancestor (the D−D link is detrimental for
both), and hence a neighboring cooperator with high age can conquer
the site of the newborn defector. This procedure occurs repeatedly, ul-
timately resulting in a practically blocked (more precisely an oscillat-
ing) front between C and D regions (left panel). Importantly, a similar
blocking is not present around old (and thus influential) cooperators
because their cooperator-cooperator links help newborn cooperators
to achieve higher age, in turn supporting the overall maintenance of
cooperative behavior (right panel). In both panels the size of players is
proportional to their age (i.e. their teaching activity). Dashed (solid)
arrows denote attempted (successful) strategy adoption processes.
to aging were recently introduced in the voter model
(Stark et al., 2008a,b), showing that age and memory-
dependent transition rates can have a positive effect on
consensus formation. A recent work focusing on ag-
ing within evolutionary games is due to Szolnoki et al.
(2009), and in the following we present a summary of
the proposed coevolutionary rules for aging as well as
their main implications.
Since age is often associated with knowledge and
wisdom an individual is able to accumulate over the
years, it was introduced through a simple tunable func-
tion that maps age to teaching activity (see Section 3.3)
of the corresponding player. More precisely, wx in Eq. 4
was related to the integer age ex = 0, 1, . . . , emax in
accordance with the function wx = (ex/emax)α, where
emax = 99, denoting the maximal possible age of a
player, serves the bounding of wx to the unit inter-
val, and α determines the level of heterogeneity in the
ex → wx mapping. Evidently, α = 0 corresponds to
the classical (homogeneous) spatial model with wx = 1
characterizing all players, α = 1 ensures that wx and
ex have the same distribution, whereas values of α ≥ 2
impose a power law distribution of strategy transfer ca-
pability. Although different age distributions of players
were considered also as quenched system states, the fo-
cus was on the study of aging as a coevolutionary pro-
cess, entailing death and newborns. Two rules were con-
sidered separately, both starting with ex being assigned
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randomly from a uniform distribution within the interval
[0, emax] to all players, and subsequently increasing all
ex by 1 after each full Monte Carlo step. Also inherent
to both was that ex was set to zero for all players whose
age exceeded emax (effectively this means that a new-
born follows the dead player). The difference was in the
way age of players that have just adopted a new strategy
from one of their neighbors was handled. In the coevo-
lutionary model A their age was left unchanged, while
in the coevolutionary model B they were considered as
newborns, i.e. as soon as player x adopted a new strat-
egy its age was set to ex = 0. Notably, rules A and B can
be interpreted rather differently. From a purely biolog-
ical viewpoint the more successful player replaces the
neighbor with its own offspring, who therefore initially
has a limited strategy transfer capability, which corre-
sponds to rule B. On the other hand, especially in social
systems, strategy adoptions may not necessarily involve
death and newborns, but may indicate solely a change
of heart, preference, or way of thinking, whereby this
situation corresponds to rule A. Nevertheless, newborns
in a social context can be considered those that changed
their strategy recently, and therefore have a low reputa-
tion initially. Interestingly, it was found that the small
difference between coevolutionary rules A and B may
have significant consequences for the evolution of co-
operation. Foremost, it was found that rule B promotes
cooperation remarkably better than rule A. However, the
difference could not be explained by the resulting het-
erogeneity of the distributions of wx, for example via
a similar reasoning as introduced by Perc and Szolnoki
(2008), since both rules return power law distributed
values with rather similar slopes (−0.5 for A and −0.7
for B). In fact, it was shown that the coevolutionary
rule B introduces a new powerful mechanism for pro-
motion of cooperation acting solely on a microscopic
player-to-player basis, and as such is thus virtually not
detectable by statistical methods assessing the hetero-
geneity of the system. The mechanism was found re-
lying on a highly selective promotion of cooperator-
cooperator and defector-defector pairs, which hinders
influential defectors (those having ex close to emax) to
spread their strategy effectively across the spatial grid.
In particular, rule B always leads to influential players
being surrounded by newborns. Thereby it is impor-
tant to note that whenever an old defector, with a high
strategy transfer capability wx, is imitated by one of the
neighbors, further spreading of defection is blocked be-
cause the newborn defector has no chance to pass strat-
egy D further. At that time a neighboring cooperator
with high age can strike back and conquer the site of the
newborn defector. As a result the whole procedure starts
Figure 9: Snapshot of a typical distribution of players on a 100 × 100
square lattice, obtained by considering players who have adopted a
new strategy as newborns [coevolutionary rule B in Szolnoki et al.
(2009)]. Full black (open green) boxes depict influential defectors
(cooperators) while yellow and white are all other non-influential
defectors and cooperators, respectively. The snapshot demonstrates
clearly that the propagation of defectors is blocked in space as a con-
sequence of age-related teaching activity.
again, which ultimately results in a practically blocked
(more precisely an oscillating) front between C and D
regions. Crucially, a similar blocking mechanism is not
present around old (and thus influential) cooperators be-
cause their cooperator-cooperator links help newborn
cooperators to achieve higher age, in turn supporting the
overall maintenance of cooperative behavior. The main
differences in the propagation of different strategy pair-
ups are summarized in Fig. 8, while an example of the
resulting spatial distribution of players is presented in
Fig. 9. In the latter a player is considered as influential
if its age exceeds that of any of its neighbors by at least
emax/2 (qualitatively similar snapshots can be obtained
by choosing different thresholds as well).
In model A the situation is significantly different
since cooperative domains, created around old players
with high wx, cannot prevail long. Namely, the central
cooperator who built up the cooperative domain eventu-
ally dies, and the arriving newborn with an accordingly
low strategy transfer capability simply cannot maintain
this domain further, thus giving defectors an opportu-
nity to win it over. As a consequence of the dynamical
origin of the observed cooperation-promoting mecha-
nism brought about by rule B, it is expected that it will
work in other cases too, for example when the interac-
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tion graph is characterized by a different topology, by
other evolutionary games, or by separated time scales
between aging and strategy adaptations, as was shown
already by Szolnoki et al. (2009).
Finally, it is important to note that the observed
cooperation-promoting mechanism relying on a dynam-
ical process is robust even if non-monotonous mappings
between ex and wx are considered (the oldest individu-
als may not necessarily be the most influential). Indeed,
the promotion of cooperation remains intact as long as
the plausible assumption that very young players should
have none or very little influence is adhered to.
Similarly as mobility reviewed in Section 3.4, we
note that aging as a coevolutionary process seems very
liable to further studies as well, and we hope this brief
summary succeeded in wetting the appetite for them.
3.6. Related approaches
Aside from thus far reviewed coevolutionary rules,
there exist examples (Kirchkamp, 1999; Gintis, 2003;
Axelrod et al., 2004; Hamilton and Taborsky, 2005;
Fort, 2008a; Hatzopoulos and Jensen, 2008; Ding et al.,
2009; Moyano and Sa´nchez, 2009; Scheuring, 2009;
Rankin and Taborsky, 2009; Szabo´ et al., 2009) we
were unable to classify into the above subsections.
Without going into much details as it exceeds the scope
of this mini review, we briefly describe some of these
related approaches, but refer the reader to the original
works for further details.
Kirchkamp (1999), for example, studied the si-
multaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies,
whereby the former were determined endogenously
based on the success of strategies observed in the neigh-
borhood of any given player. It was shown that en-
dogenous learning rules put more weight on the proper
understanding of each player’s own experience rather
than on the experience of an observed neighbor. Co-
evolving learning rules were recently considered also
by Moyano and Sa´nchez (2009), showing that imitation
is frequently displaced by replication, in turn leading
to a rapid decrease of cooperation in the spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma game. On the other hand, imitation was
found to be superior to global but stochastic imitation,
thereby facilitating cooperative behavior. The coevo-
lutionary selection of strategy adoption rules was con-
sider by Szabo´ et al. (2009) as well, where the uncer-
tainty in the Fermi function (see Eq. 1) was subject to
evolution as a player-specific property. In particular, in-
stead of a single K value authors introduced different
Ki values where i ∈ (1, 2 . . . , n), which were then as-
signed randomly to the players. As we have already
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Figure 10: Time dependencies of the fraction of initial Ki values (νKi )
demonstrate the selection of the most appropriate strategy adoption
uncertainty K⋆ (promoting cooperation best), as indicated by the red
solid line. This directly implies the spontaneous selection of an opti-
mal strategy adoption rule within the scope of the Fermi function (see
Eq. 1), as reported by Szabo´ et al. (2009). Dashed blue lines depicted
the extinction of the other Ki values. Initially, n = 20 different Ki
values were distributed on the square lattice of size N = 10002 . The
temptation to defect was b = 1.05.
noted in Section 2, the uncertainty by strategy adop-
tions can originate from different sources, ranging from
unpredictable variations in payoffs to errors in the deci-
sion making (Vukov et al., 2006; Perc, 2006b; Du et al.,
2009b; Wu and Holme, 2009; Du et al., 2009a). The pa-
rameter K, however, can also be considered as charac-
terizing the willingness of a player to risk a payoff quan-
tity during a strategy change. Therefore, by using dif-
ferent values of K, not only the better strategy but also
the way of strategy adoption can be the subject of an
imitation process.
Accordingly, aside from the fact that player y could
adopt the strategy of player x according to Eq. 1 (sx →
sy), an additional independent trail with the same prob-
ability was made also for the adoption of the imita-
tion rule (Kx → Ky). It was shown that, if the sys-
tem is seeded by random initial conditions, the proposed
coevolutionary rule drives the system towards a state
where a single K⋆ value (only one of the initial Ki val-
ues) prevails. This final strategy adoption uncertainty
is closely related with the parameter value warranting
the highest cooperation level if a given value of K is
used for all players at a certain value of the temptation
to defect b (see Fig. 1). Naturally, the prevailing K⋆
value thus depends also on the topology of the inter-
action network. The selection process is illustrated in
Fig. 10, where n = 20 different Ki values were initially
assigned to the players x ∈ (1, 2 . . . , N). Summarizing
the main observation, it was shown that a Darwinian
18
selection rule affecting a model parameter can sponta-
neously lead to the prevalence of the value that ensures
an optimal level of cooperation in the system. For fur-
ther details we refer the reader to the original work of
Szabo´ et al. (2009).
The evolution of altruistic behavior under coevolu-
tionary rules was studied also in what can be con-
sidered more explicitly biologically or even humanly
motivated settings (Gintis, 2003; Axelrod et al., 2004;
McNamara et al., 2008; Scheuring, 2009; Ding et al.,
2009). For example, internal norms, being a pattern
of behavior enforced in part by internal sanctions, such
as shame, guilt and loss of self-esteem, were found to
provide support for the evolution of altruistic norms,
and moreover, via a gene-culture coevolution argument
an explanation was provided as to why individually
fitness-reducing internal norms are likely to be proso-
cial rather than socially harmful (Gintis, 2003). Al-
though mentioned already in Section 3.5, the study of
McNamara et al. (2008) in fact focuses on the coevolu-
tion of choosiness, the later relying on cooperativeness
being used by other individuals as a choice criterion.
In such a setting competition to be more generous than
others can emerge, and in this case the evolution of co-
operation between unrelated individuals can be driven
by a positive feedback between increasing levels of co-
operativeness and choosiness. It was shown that, in situ-
ations where individuals have the opportunity to engage
in repeated pairwise interactions, the evolution of coop-
eration depends critically on the amount of behavioral
variation that is being maintained in the population by
processes such as mutation.
Finally, we note that Hatzopoulos and Jensen
(2008) investigated the evolution of cooperation
in a so-called nongrowth dynamic network model
with a death-birth dynamics based on tournament
selection, Hamilton and Taborsky (2005) as well as
Rankin and Taborsky (2009) studied the coevolution
of group structure rather than graph structure in the
context of generalized reciprocity, while Fort (2008a)
considered evolving heterogeneous games as means to
sustain cooperation. Interestingly, in the later study
the players had individual payoff elements assigned to
them for calculating their final payoffs. Accordingly,
within the realm of the proposed coevolutionary rule a
player could adopt not only the strategy of the neighbor
but also its individual payoff matrix elements. It was
found that if starting with a random heterogeneous
distribution of payoffs, eventually only a small number
of definite payoff matrices remained while the oth-
ers went ‘extinct’. On the other hand, if the initial
rank of individual payoff elements agreed with those
constituting social dilemma games, the prevailing one
was found to be the stag-hunt game. Considering the
latter result in the light of findings reported within the
evolving adoption rules model by Szabo´ et al. (2009), it
is possible to raise the question if coevolutionary rules
as a selection mechanism can spontaneously drive the
system into a state where mutual cooperation ensures
the maximal average payoff. Indeed, further studies
are necessary to clarify this issue. In sum, there are
few boundaries to imagination when considering what
coevolutionary rules might affect, and certainly, it
seems like all facets of existence can be brought into
consideration.
4. Conclusions and outlook
As we hope the above mini review on coevolutionary
games clearly shows, coevolution is certainly a promis-
ing concept to follow, as it constitutes the most natural
upgrade of evolutionary games in the sense that not only
do the strategies evolve in time, but so does the environ-
ment, and indeed many other factors that in turn affect
back the outcome of the evolution of strategies. Some of
these coevolutionary processes are of a finite duration,
and thus on their own do not necessarily affect the out-
come of evolutionary games but do this only indirectly
due to the environment that they produce, while others
are lasting, introducing dynamical alterations that affect
the evolution of cooperation on a continuous basis. In
the future, it should be of interest to further elaborate
on the question whether coevolution itself may promote
cooperation by introducing dynamical mechanisms, or
if mainly the final outcome of a coevolutionary process,
if it exists, is the one vital for the sustenance of coop-
eration. Often, however, it is the interplay of both that
facilitates the promotion of cooperation, as it was al-
ready shown in some of the works. It should also be
considered which coevolutionary processes end sooner
or later, and which are those that at least in principle
should last forever. For example, the growth of a city
can be considered something that has a finite duration
due to environmental constrains, while aging, on the
other hand, is a natural ingredient of every living organ-
ism, and as such it should only make sense to consider
it evolving permanently.
Although social dilemmas may emerge at differ-
ent levels of human and animal interactions, their
occurrence is by no means limited to these exam-
ples. The applicability of the concept of evolution-
ary games extends across the whole of social and nat-
ural sciences, with examples ranging from the RNA
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virus (Turner and Chao, 1999), ATP-Producing Path-
ways (Pfeiffer et al., 2001) and biochemical systems
(Frick and Schuster, 2003; Pfeiffer and Schuster, 2005;
Chettaoui et al., 2007; Schuster et al., 2008), to traffic
congestion (Helbing et al., 2005; Perc, 2007a) and cli-
mate change (Milinski et al., 2006; Pfeiffer and Nowak,
2006; Milinski et al., 2008), to name but a few. In this
sense coevolutionary rules should be applied to evolu-
tionary games in the broadest possible sense, with spe-
cially adapted motivation fitting to the research avenue
of the main evolutionary process. Moreover, while fo-
cusing predominantly on resolving social dilemmas, co-
evolutionary rules have thus far not been considered for
many other game types, as for example the public goods
game, the ultimatum game or the rock-scissors-paper
game. These gaps should be interesting to fill as well,
in particular when striving towards universal concepts
underlying cooperation in the broadest possible sense.
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